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Japanese Nuclear Power and the Kyoto Agreement
Mustafa Babiker, John M. Reilly and A. Denny Ellerman†
Abstract
We find that, on an economic basis, nuclear power could make a substantial contribution for meeting the
emissions target Japan agreed to in the Kyoto Protocol. It is unlikely however that the contribution would be
as large as projected in official Japanese forecasts. The economic costs of the carbon constraint rise if
siting, construction, and approval problems prevent the economically desirable level of expansion of nuclear
power. We also evaluate the economic effects of subsidizing nuclear power to achieve the expansion
projected in official forecasts. While the subsidy required is substantial, the economic welfare effects are
relatively small because of second-best considerations. We use the EPPA model, a global computable
general equilibrium model, in the analysis. Our estimates thus include the effects of changing world energy
prices and terms of trade as they affect competitiveness of nuclear power and economic welfare.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Kyoto Protocol of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) seeks to limit
carbon emissions. Japan agreed to reduce 2008–2012 greenhouse gas (GHG) emission by 6%
below 1990 levels (FCCC, 1998). Official Japanese forecasts foresee meeting this reduction
through substantial expansion of nuclear power (MITI/ANRE, 1998a). Nuclear power is an
attractive energy technology for meeting carbon dioxide restrictions because there are no direct
emissions of CO2. To be economically attractive, however, it must compete with other measures
that could also reduce emissions. Apart from the tangible costs of nuclear power, there are
difficulties in siting and gaining local approval for new nuclear plants. These difficulties could
be a further constraint on using nuclear power as a main instrument for meeting the relatively
near-term requirements of the Kyoto agreement.
We evaluate the economic implications of carbon dioxide restrictions on the Japanese
economy using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis Model (EPPA). We impose
an economy-wide constraint on carbon emissions in EPPA to evaluate the economically efficient
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2level of nuclear power expansion as a response to a carbon constraint. EPPA is a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy. We focus on the year 2010 as
representative of the 5-year period over which average emissions in Annex B countries must
meet the Kyoto protocol limits. We focus particular attention on the potential contribution of
nuclear power in meeting the Kyoto carbon reduction target.
There have been some other recent studies of nuclear power in Japan (e.g., Kawai and Oda,
1998). A major difference of this study is that we use a global general equilibrium model.
Computational requirements mean that the model has somewhat limited detail on the electric
power sector. The advantage of the model is that we are able to investigate economy-wide
interactions as well as international trade effects. One important effect is that simultaneously
constraining carbon emissions in all Annex B countries leads to a significant fall in the price of
oil, an internationally traded good. The fall in the price of oil affects the relative economics of
nuclear versus fossil generated electric power. Broader trade effects include changes in the terms
of trade of Japan (the price of its exports relative to its imports). The CGE model also allows us
to compute several different measures of economic impact including the effect on GNP, on
welfare in terms of equivalent variation, and on the shadow price associated with the carbon
constraint.1  EPPA does not model economic damages due to climate change and, as a
result, does not capture any welfare benefits (reductions in damages) due to the carbon
constraint. Thus, our analysis should be considered a cost-effectiveness analysis.
We provide a more complete description of the model in Section 2, a description of our
reference case and how we constructed policy and sensitivity cases in Section 3, the results of
the model simulations in Section 4, and our major conclusions in Section 5.
2. THE EPPA-GTAP MODEL
EPPA has been designed to analyze climate change policy and has been used extensively for
this purpose (Yang et al., 1996; Jacoby et al., 1997). While the overall framework of EPPA-
GTAP is similar to previous versions, it includes several significant revisions. Among the most
significant changes for the analysis presented here were updating the model to use the GTAP
data, changes in the resource component of the model, and modeling of nuclear power as a
separate electricity generation technology. These latter changes are particularly relevant to the
assessment of nuclear power because they affect comparative costs of nuclear and fossil fuel
generated electricity.
2.1 Model Description
The EPPA model is a recursive dynamic multi-regional general equilibrium model of the
world economy. The current version of EPPA is built on a comprehensive energy-economy data
set (GTAP-E2) that accommodates a consistent representation of energy markets in physical units
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3as well as detailed accounts of regional
production and bilateral trade flows. The
base year for the model is 1995 and the
model is solved recursively through
2100 at 5-year intervals. There are three
commodity groupings and 12 regions in
EPPA. Description of the specific
regions and commodities included in the
model is provided on Table 1.
Nested CES functions are used to
describe technologies and preferences.
Figure 1 illustrates the nesting structure
employed for production sectors and
Figure 2 shows that for the final demand
sector. The model default substitution
elasticities are reported in Table 2.
The model’s equilibrium framework
is based on final demands for goods and
services in each region arising from a
representative agent. Final demands are
subject to an income balance constraint
with fixed marginal propensity to save.
Investment is saving driven and capital
is accumulated subject to vintaging and
depreciation. Consumption within each
region is financed from factor income
and taxes. Taxes apply to energy
demand, factor income and international
trade, and these finance an exogenously
grown level of public provision. Capital
flows in base year accounts are phased
out gradually and the government
budget is balanced each period through
lump-sum taxes.
Along the baseline, fossil energy
resources are calibrated to an exogenous
price path for fuels through 2010, and
afterwards they are driven by a long-run
resource depletion module. Energy
goods and other commodities are traded
in world markets. Crude oil is imported
and exported as a homogeneous product,
subject to tariffs and export taxes.
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4Table 1. Countries, Regions, and Sectors in the General Equilibrium Model
Country or Region Commodities
USA United States AGRIC Agriculture
JPN Japan COAL Coal
EEC Europe OIL Crude Oil
OOE Other OECD† Countries GAS Natural Gas
FSU Former Soviet Union REFOIL Refined Oil
EET East European Associates ELEC Electricity
IND India ENERINT Energy Intensive products
BRA Brazil OTHERIND Other Industries products
CHN China (including Hong Kong & Taiwan)
EEX Energy Exporting Economies
DAE Dynamic Asian Economies
ROW Rest of world
† OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD countries: Western Europe, the United States,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, plus countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as
listed in the Kyoto Protocol.
Table 2. The Model Default Parameters
Parameter Description Value Comments
s ERVA Elasticity of substitution between
energy resource composite and
value-added
0.6 Agriculture only
s ER Substitution between land and
energy-material bundle
0.6 Agriculture
s AE Substitution between energy and
material composite
0.3 Agriculture
s VA Substitution between labor & capital 1 All sectors except nuclear in which is 0.5
s ENOE Substitiution between electric and
non electric energy
0.5 All sectors
s EN Substitution among non-electric
energy
1 All sectors except for electricity where coal and oil
generation substitute at 0.3 among themselves and at 1
with gas
s GR Substitution between fixed factor
and the rest of inputs
0.6 All sectors that have fixed resource, except nuclear
generation where it is calibrated to match exogenous
supply elasticity
s EVA Substitution between energy and
value added composite
0.4 For all sectors except energy intensive and other
industry where it is 0.5
s DM Armington substitution between
domestic and imports
3 All goods except Electricity where it is 0.3
s MM Armington substitution across
imports
5
4
Non-energy goods
Energy goods, except refined oil (6) and electricity (0.5)
s CS Temporal substitution between
consumption and saving
1 Final demand sector
s C Substitution across consumption
goods
Varies across countries and is updated with income
recursively to reflect income elasticities based on an
econometrically estimated equation
G0 Labor supply annual growth rate
in efficiency units
2%
2.5-6%
For developed countries and converges to 1 by 2100
For developing countries and converges to 1.5% by 2100
5All other goods, including energy
products such as coal and natural gas,
are characterized by product
differentiation with an explicit
representation of bilateral trade flows
calibrated to the reference year, 1995.
Energy products (refined oil, coal,
natural gas, and electricity) are sold at
different prices to industrial customers
and final consumers. All existing
energy subsidies are phased out
gradually along the baseline.
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Figure 2. Final Demand Structure
2.2 Nuclear Power Costs and Energy Prices
The GTAP data does not provide a separate sectoral breakdown for each electric generation
technology. To develop an estimate of nuclear electricity output consistent with the GTAP data,
we applied the nuclear output share of electricity production for each EPPA region, based on
International Energy Agency data, to divide the total output of the electric sector in GTAP into two
components, nuclear and non-nuclear. To estimate input requirements for different types of power
generation we used data from on a joint study of the Nuclear Energy Agency and the International
Energy Agency (NEA/IEA, 1998) on comparative costs of different generation technologies.
As noted above, we specify energy prices exogenously in the reference case through 2010
after which the price path is determined by a resource model. The implication of setting prices
exogenously is that the quantities of the resources available are endogenously determined. These
reference-case quantities are then used in cases under policy constraint, so that energy prices
respond endogenously to the policy shocks. This approach provides the flexibility to consider the
implications of different assumptions about the price path of energy in the near term, independent
of longer-term resource considerations. For example, the exogenous price path can be interpreted
as a gradual reestablishment of long-term equilibrium conditions from a disequilibrium state in
the base year. Or, it can reflect changes in monopoly power and associated monopoly rents that
lead to a change in the value of the resource. In constructing our reference case we noted that
energy prices had declined on the order of 25 to 30% between 1995 (the base year) and 1998.
There has since been some recovery in oil prices but many expect that energy prices may remain
below the 1995 level for some time. We imposed gradual price declines in all energy prices from
1995 through 2010. This implies some recovery from 1998 lows.
3. POLICY STUDIES
Most economic variables such as GDP growth, energy prices, wages, and other variables are
endogenously determined within the model reflecting the choice of parameter values as
described in Section 2. The standard approach for simulating the impacts of a policy change in a
computable general equilibrium model is to generate a reference scenario, impose a policy, and
compare the economic effects between the reference and policy cases.
63.1 Measures of Policy Costs
We compare the economic effects of policies in terms of economic welfare (equivalent
variation), Gross National Product (GNP), and the shadow price of the carbon constraint. These
measures have somewhat different interpretations. The reference solution to a general equilibrium
model is generated such that resources available to the economy are used in the most efficient
manner given the reference technology and policy constraints. As a result, any new intervention
(such as a carbon constraint) will cause the economy to use resources less efficiently. Such an
intervention will, as a result, generally lead to a reduction in economic welfare compared with
the reference case.3 Economic welfare, measured as equivalent variation, is the amount of income
consumers would need to compensate them for the welfare losses due to the policy.
GNP is measure of the productive capacity of the economy. A change in economic welfare
is a more comprehensive measure of the impact on the economy, because it includes both the
change in output (GNP) and the change in consumer prices. Constraining the economy to use
resources less efficiently will tend to reduce output of goods and services and, consequently,
reduce GNP, consumption and welfare. Consumer price changes also depend on changes in the
terms of trade (the relative price of exported versus imported goods). The terms-of-trade effect
depends both on what happens to other Annex B regions that are sources of Japanese imports
and to the cost of Japanese export goods. These terms-of-trade changes affect the calculation
of welfare, but not directly affect GNP.
The shadow price of carbon is the cost to the economy of controlling the last ton of carbon
needed to meet the constraint, whereas both welfare and GNP impacts are estimates of the total
cost of a policy constraint. The shadow price of carbon is the Lagrangian multiplier associated
with a carbon constraint imposed on producers (including household production) computed as
part of the economic optimization problem. In other work with EPPA we have simulated the
shadow price of carbon under a set of different carbon policies to generate a Marginal Abatement
Curve (MAC) that relates the reduction in emissions from reference to the shadow price
(Ellerman and Decaux, 1998).
3.2 Policy Cases and Sensitivities
We evaluate several policy and sensitivity cases as summarized in Table 3. We evaluate
the likely growth in nuclear power in a reference case without the Kyoto agreement. We then
constrain the model so that Annex B countries including Japan individually meet the agreed
targets set out in the Kyoto Protocol. We include the Kyoto constraint for all regions in Annex B
because doing so has implications for the changes in terms of trade.4 We compare nuclear power
growth in the constrained case to that in the reference case, and to MITI forecasts of nuclear
power growth. In these cases, nuclear power competes on the basis of comparative economics
with fossil generated electricity.
We consider additional cases where nuclear power expansion is prescribed at levels other than
those predicted by EPPA, which are based on pure economic considerations. These include a
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 See, Babiker and Jacoby (1999) for a description of the implications of implementing the Kyoto agreement for
other regions.
7constrained nuclear power case where, by 2010, only those plants now under construction or
commissioning are completed. There is currently one nuclear power plant under construction
with a capacity of 825 MW and four plants under commissioning with a combined capacity of
4,663 MW. There are currently 51 plants in operation with a combined capacity of 44,917 MW
so these additions would represent a 12% increase in generating capacity.5 This case represents
the prospect that getting local approval for additional nuclear power plants may be a constraint
on further expansion, at least in the 2008–2012 time period. The evidence from nuclear power
plants completed over the past two decades illustrates the difficulty that can be encountered in
planning and constructing plants. Five power plants were brought on line in Japan in the 1980s.
The time required to complete these plants, from initial planning to operation, averaged 17.4
years. The single plant brought on line in the 1990s required 25.7 years (MITI/ANRE, 1998b).
To further investigate the economic implications of moving forward with a more rapid nuclear
power plant construction program, we also prescribe nuclear power expansion at the level
projected by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Table 4). The basic elements of
Table 3. Policy and Sensitivity Cases
Constraint/
Sensitivity Case Value Comments
GNP growth,
%/yr, 1995-2010
Reference GNP:
High GNP:
1.5
2.3
The High GNP growth corresponds to the MITI/ANRE (1998a)
GNP forecasted growth over the period.
Carbon constraint,
2010, MtC
Kyoto Policy 1103 Calculated to be 94% of 1173 MtC emitted in 1990. All Annex B
regions constrained to meet Kyoto commitment as in FCCC (1998).
Energy Prices,
%/yr change,
1995-2010
Prices
  Oil:
  Gas:
  Coal:
Ref.
-1.6
-0.1
0
High
+1
+1
+1
Reference (Ref.) levels assume that energy prices through 2010 are
in the range observed between 1995 and 1998. Oil is modeled as
a Hecksher-Ohlin good with a common world price. Coal and gas
are modeled as Armington goods. Price changes reported are
domestic price changes in Japan.
Nuclear,
% increase,
1995-2010
High Nuclear
Low Nuclear
65
12
The high case corresponds to the MITI projection. The low case
corresponds to the addition of the 5 units either under construction
or commissioning.
Table 4. MITI Electricity Sector Forecasts, GWh
1995 1996 2010
GWh % GWh % GWh %
Coal 118,100 14 123,700 14 136,000 13
Oil 157,100 18 154,700 18 87,000 8
Gas 219,800 25 203,700 23 213,000 20
Nuclear 291,100 33 302,100 35 480,000 45
Hydro 86,000 10 83,800 10 119,000 11
Geothermal 3,100 0 3,600 0 12,000 1
Renewable 1,200 0 1,300 0 9,000 1
Total 876,400 100 872,900 100 1,056,000 100
Sources: Data for 1995 are from MITI/ANRE (1997); Data for 1996 and projections for 2010 are from MITI/ANRE (1998a).
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 By constraining production increases at this 12% level we assume no further increase in the capacity utilization
factor. Since the 1970s when capacity utilization factor was on the order of 50%, Japan’s average capacity factor
has risen to just over 80% (MITI/ANARE, 1998b).
8the forecast include an increase in the share of power produced by nuclear from 33 to 45%, while
electricity production increases by 20% between 1995 and 2010. The increased share of nuclear
requires an increase in nuclear generated electricity of 65% with absolute reductions in generation
of oil, gas and coal combined between 2000 and 2010 of nearly 20%. Oil generated power sees
the largest decline, 45% between 1995 and 2010. For nuclear to expand at this rate thus requires
that the levelized cost of a new nuclear power plant be less than the fuel cost alone of gas, oil, and
coal generated electricity since the capacity to generate electricity with these fuels already exists.
The subsidy required to meet this target is endogenously computed in the EPPA model.
We also consider the sensitivity of our results to the rate of GNP growth and fossil energy
prices because future carbon emissions and the costs of meeting a carbon constraint depend on
these factors. To test the sensitivity of results to GNP growth we increased the labor efficiency
parameter to generate a High GNP growth case. The High GNP growth case (2.3% per year) was
chosen to be identical to the MITI/ANRE (1998a) forecast to facilitate comparison of our model
results with the MITI forecasts for electricity and nuclear power production. Faster economic
growth generates higher emissions in the reference case and requires larger reductions in
emissions when compared with the reference GNP growth case. The Marginal Abatement Curve
(MAC) in Figure 3 illustrates how the shadow price of carbon and total costs of abatement is
highly dependent on the required reduction and also compares the MAC for Japan with other
Annex B regions.6 The marginal abatement curve for Japan rises steeply so that the carbon price
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Figure 3. EPPA GTAP/IEA (version 3.0) Annex B Marginal Abatement Curves (2010, No Trading)
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 The MAC in Figure 3 was constructed as in Ellerman and Decaux (1998) using output from the version of the
model described herein.
9is much higher if GNP and consequently carbon emissions grow more rapidly. As a summary of
the complex EPPA model, the MAC can be used to indicate what the approximate effects on the
carbon price will be with different required reductions.
As discussed previously, in the reference case fossil energy prices were prescribed to fall
between 1995 and 2010. We include a sensitivity case where, instead, oil, coal, and gas prices
rise by 1.0% per year in Japan and similarly worldwide. Over the past four or five years world
oil prices have ranged from around $18 per barrel to as low as $12 barrel, illustrative of the
uncertainty in fossil energy prices.
4. RESULTS
The largest differences in the impact of the Kyoto protocol occurs between those scenarios
with Reference and the High GNP growth (Table 5). By construction, growth in the economy
and hence welfare is much higher in the high GNP case. As energy use and carbon emissions are
closely tied to economic growth we find, as a result, that the carbon price (in 1995 $US) is nearly
$200 per ton higher ($461 compared with $269) in the High GNP case. Loss in welfare due to
the carbon constraint in the reference GNP case is 0.9% in the year 2010 but is 1.9% in the high
GNP case reflecting the steeply rising marginal costs associated with making larger emissions
reductions. The GNP losses are generally larger (1.5 and 2.5% in the Reference and High GNP
growth cases, respectively) than the losses in welfare. This can be traced to the terms-of-trade
effects (Babiker and Jacoby, 1999). A significant part of this terms-of-trade effect is that carbon
constraints imposed in the Annex B countries reduce world energy prices. Lower energy prices
improve the terms of trade for energy importers such as Japan while energy exporters suffer
deterioration in their terms of trade. This terms-of-trade improvement is the main reason why
the welfare cost is less than the fall in GNP.
Table 5: Japan, Nuclear Power, and Kyoto
Percentage Change, 1995-2010 1995 $US
GNP Welfare Nuclear Electricity Carbon Price
Reference 25.1 27.4 6 15 n.a.
with Kyoto 23.6 26.5 24 8 269
12% nuclear growth† 23.4 26.3 12 7.5 289
 65% nuclear growth* 23.7 26.4 65 9.4 197
High GNP growth 40.4 43.7 6 26 n.a.
with Kyoto 37.5 41.8 32 14 461
 12% nuclear growth 37.1 41.5 12 13.6 505
 65% nuclear growth 37.6 41.8 65 16 382
Reference, high energy price 24.3 26.7 9 13 n.a.
with Kyoto 23.3 26.1 23 8 209
High GNP, high energy price 39.5 42.9 9 24 n.a.
 with Kyoto 37.2 41.5 31 15 391
† In the 12% nuclear cases the quota constraint is on nuclear fuel and the percentage refers to percentage reduction in the
nuclear fuel resource.
* In the 65% nuclear cases, nuclear production is subsidized and the subsidy percentage is on the total cost of nuclear
production.
n.a. = not applicable
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Electricity growth is also closely related to GNP growth. It grows 15% between 1995 and
2010 in our reference case but 26% in the High GNP case. Nuclear power growth is, however,
not influenced by economic growth in these cases. This result can be traced to the fact that low
fossil fuel prices in these two cases provide little incentive to expand nuclear. The 6% increase
in nuclear power production simulated in these cases could be achieved by completing just two
plants (e.g., the one plant under construction plus only one of the four plants under
commissioning).
If Japan meets the Kyoto target with an economically efficient, economy-wide instrument
such as a carbon tax or a tradable permit system our simulations suggest a much wider economic
role for nuclear power. In the High GNP growth case nuclear power expansion is 32%. This is,
however, only about one-half the increase projected in the MITI forecast. One reason is that the
carbon constraint reduces GNP by 3%. More importantly, electricity use is significantly curtailed
(a 14% increase instead of 26%). In the MITI forecast electricity growth is just over 20%
(Table 3). In the reference GNP case with the Kyoto constraint electricity growth is only 8%.
One important conclusion is that our simulations see a far greater response in electricity use as a
result of an efficient economy-wide carbon control policy than in the MITI forecast. This comes
about in our model because rising costs of electricity generation is passed on to consumers as
higher prices, damping demand growth.
While these simulations show less nuclear power growth than the MITI forecast, they still
project a substantial nuclear power plant construction program. In the High GNP case
approximately twelve new power plants (on the order of 1200 MW each ) would be required; that
is, seven more beyond the five already under construction or commissioning. In the Reference
GNP case, nine new power plants would be required, four more beyond the five already under
construction or commissioning. This is in contrast to the total of twenty-two new plants (including
the one plant under construction plus the four under commissioning) in the MITI forecast.
When we prescribe nuclear power expansion at the level projected by MITI we find the need
for significant subsidies for nuclear power. To achieve the 65% increase in nuclear power
production in our scenarios requires a subsidy in the reference GNP case equal to 67% of the
cost of nuclear power production. In the High GNP case the subsidy must equal 53% of the cost
of nuclear power.7
When we constrain nuclear power expansion to a 12% increase from 1995, electricity
consumption is reduced somewhat due to higher prices and GDP and welfare declines, compared
with the cases where only the carbon constraint is implemented. The shadow price of carbon
increases by about $20 per ton in the Reference GNP case and $40 per ton in the High GNP case.
The shadow price rises because other parts of the economy must reduce carbon emissions
further. The effect when nuclear power is subsidized is to reduce the shadow price of carbon by
$70 to $80 per ton. The shadow price falls in these cases because the subsidization of nuclear
lessens the need to reduce carbon elsewhere in the economy. Electricity consumption increases
in this case because the subsidy of nuclear reduces electricity prices to consumers.
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 A subsidy of nuclear power production is one mechanism that could be used to force this expansion. Other
mechanisms such as taxes on other generation modes, or forced retirement of them, would have somewhat
different implications for consumers and the economy.
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While the effects on the shadow price of carbon in the nuclear constrained and subsidy cases
are in opposite directions, both show additional loses in economic welfare from the case where
the Kyoto target is achieved with an economy-wide carbon constraint. The difference is,
however, less than 0.1% of welfare in the High GNP growth case compared with the welfare loss
of 0.3% for the constrained nuclear case.8 The constrained case involves a 20% lower increase in
nuclear in the high GNP case, whereas the subsidy case requires an additional 33% expansion of
nuclear. This asymmetric effect can be traced to the fact that there are large excise taxes on
electricity production in Japan. These taxes amount to a pre-existing distortion. The nuclear
production subsidy, by decreasing electricity prices, partially offsets the effect on welfare of
taxes that raise prices to consumers. The nuclear power subsidy is not a true “second best”
policy. It creates additional welfare losses whereas a second-best policy would improve welfare
but not as much as the “first best” policy of removing the distortionary taxes. Nevertheless, the
pre-existing taxes make the nuclear subsidy case relatively less costly in welfare terms than it
would be without the taxes.
In the sensitivity exercise (with fossil prices rising by 1.0% per year from 1995 to 2010) the
reference cases (without the carbon constraint) exhibit losses in welfare and GNP compared with
the same calculation under reference energy price cases. This result is fully expected. Higher
fossil energy prices are clearly a burden on an economy that must import energy. Electricity
growth is also slower. Nuclear power production expands more (9% as compared with 6%).
In the carbon constrained cases, the carbon price is lower and nuclear power expansion is
somewhat less than in the comparable cases with the reference energy prices. This reflects the
fact that higher fossil energy prices already reduce carbon emissions throughout the economy,
with less need to expand nuclear power.
5. SUMMARY
The rate of economic growth through 2010 is the largest source of difference in estimates of
the cost to the Japanese economy of meeting the Kyoto Protocol. With GNP growth of 1.5% per
year, we estimate the annual cost of the Kyoto Protocol in 2010 to be 0.9% of total welfare
compared with welfare in the reference GNP growth case. The cost in terms of welfare rises to
1.9% with economic growth of 2.3% per year compared with welfare in high GNP growth case.
Clearly, however, the average Japanese consumer is far better off with higher economic growth
even if (s)he must bear a higher cost of Kyoto. With high GNP growth, economic welfare is
more than 50% higher in 2010 than in the reference GNP growth, with or without Kyoto, and
across the measures we examined to implement Kyoto.
A recent MITI forecast included economic growth of 2.3% per year and anticipated a 65%
expansion of nuclear power production to meet the Kyoto target. Our model results project a
much less rapid expansion of nuclear power. To achieve a 65% increase in nuclear power would
require large subsidies (we estimate 50–70% of the cost of nuclear power production) or other
policy measures. Such expansion would also require rapid local approval for new nuclear power
plants and commissioning of these plants for operation. Attempting to meet Kyoto with this rapid
nuclear expansion would be more costly in terms of welfare than applying uniform carbon tax or
                                                 
8
 The difference is indistinguishable when rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent as in Table 5.
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implementing a cap and trade system. The extra welfare cost in the subsidy case is quite small,
however, because of pre-existing distortions in the electricity market that raise the price of
electricity to consumers. The nuclear subsidy, by lowering the cost of electricity, partly offsets
the welfare losses from the pre-existing distortions.
While we do not estimate a nuclear power expansion as rapid as in the MITI forecast, we still
see a substantial role for nuclear power if Japan is to meet the Kyoto constraint in the most cost-
effective manner. In our Kyoto policy cases, nuclear power increases between 23 and 34%
depending on economic growth and energy prices. This rate of expansion would require an
additional 4 to 7 new 1200 MW power plants beyond the 5 already under construction or
commissioning. Given the lengthy process of approval and construction in recent decades
(stretching from 17 to over 25 years), achieving even this rate of expansion may be difficult. But
failure to site and approve these plants could increase the shadow price of carbon by $20 to $40
per ton of carbon.
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